The Effect of the WHO FCTC Ratification: An Analysis Using ITSA with Synthetic Control Groups

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Once published all databases and codes will be publicly available.



- A few studies have assessed the effect of FCTC on smoking outcomes.
- Gravely et al. (2017) studies the number of FCTC's measures implemented at the highest level between 2007 and 2014 and the association with prevalence between 2005 and 2015.
- Results show that an increase in the number of implemented measures is significantly associated with a decrease in prevalence:
 - They do not use control groups, so results cannot be directly attributed to FCTC
 - Studies FCTC's measures, not the treaty itself
 - The study does not consider the implementation of measures pre-FCTC in most countries



- Anderson et al. (2016) studies the trends of policy percentages scores between 2007 and 2014 and the association with prevalence between 2010 and 2015.
- Association between higher policy scores and a decrease in prevalence
 - They do not use control groups, so results cannot be directly attributed to FCTC.
 - Studies policy scores in general, not the FCTC



- Dubray et al. (2014) studies the relationship between 2008 MPOWER composite score and changes in smoking prevalence between 2006 and 2009.
- Countries with higher MPOWER composite scores showed a greater decrease in smoking prevalence
 - They do not use control groups, so results cannot be directly attributed to FCTC.
 - Studies FCTC's measures, not the treaty itself



- Hoffman et al (2019) assess the effect of FCTC using single group ITSA with the per capita cigarette consumption. The study has some important limitations:
 - First, the intervention year is 2003 (most countries ratified in 2005 and 2006) and use around 70 countries (heavily unbalanced set of countries)
 - Second, they use the first differences of the dependent variable (absolute variations, which do not consider the initial level)
 - Third, dependent variable do not consider total consumption but registered consumption. Illicit trade is not considered (which may be endogenous to policy change)

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• Fourth, "long tail" of pre-ratification data (since 1970) which may bias results.

- Paraje et al. (2024) use the log of smokers, the log of the prevalence of smokers for the 10-24 group, and the log of the quit ratio for the 45-59 group. The analysis is for 170 countries by income group (excludes China) using single group ITSA.
- Intervention is the year of ratification of each country, so data is "regrouped" to consider that.
- Results show strong effects, especially in post-intervention trends. The cumulative reduction of young smokers after ten years of ratification is about 24 million. Some limitations:
 - They do not use control groups, so results cannot be directly attributed to FCTC.
 - They use GBD data, which has modelled data. That may be inappropriate to use with ITSA.



- This work extends Paraje et al (2024) by using a synthetic control group with ITSA.
- It also analyses the effect by sex and countries' income groups for the 10-24 population and for the 25 and older population.



Data

- Current smoker data between 1990-2020 from the IHME (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation), University of Washington
- Data for the population 10 years and older, in 5 years age group by sex
- Countries that don't have 10 years after their ratification were excluded
- For this reason, only countries that ratified between 2005 and 2010 were included, representing 96% of the total population
- Excluded countries: Andorra, Czechia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Zimbabwe, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan



Methods

- Interrupted Time Series Analysis (ITSA) with synthetic control group
- Dynamic intervention point (year of ratification for each country)
- Estimated difference between the treatment and control groups after 10 years of ratification
- Quadratic or lineal effect of treatment is chosen by the Akaike criterion



Synthetic control group

- Synthetic control groups formed using lasso (SCUL)
- Donor pool are never-ratifying countries: Argentina, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Haiti, Indonesia, Malawi, Monaco, Morocco, Somalia, South Sudan, Switzerland and the Unites States of Americas
- Countries must be separated by their ratification year because of the dynamic intervention point. Otherwise, no ratification year would be assigned to the donor pool
- Thus, we generate a synthetic control group for each ratification year (from 2005 to 2010).



Two examples: ratification years 2005, 2006 for 10-24 years



♦ Countries that Ratified × Synthetic Control

Synthetic Control Group using Lasso

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λ

Abadie et al (2010)

$$\widehat{\omega}_{Synth} = \omega(V^*) = \arg\min_{\omega} \left(\sum_{t=1}^{T_0} (y_{0t} - x_t \omega)^2 \right)$$

Hollingsworth and Wing (2020)

$$\widehat{\omega}_{lasso} = \arg \min_{\omega} \left(\sum_{t=1}^{T_0} (y_{0t} - x_t \omega)^2 + \lambda |\omega|_1 \right)$$

Ponderator

Penalty Parameter

Example of weighs: Countries ratifying in 2010, population 25+

Country	Ponderator	Country	Ponderator	
Argentina	0.1319359	Monaco	53.14688	
Cuba	-0.002568	Morocco	0.0471283	
Dominican Republic	-0.0079379	Somalia	0	
Eritrea	1.982873	South Sudan	4.294908	
Haiti	-0.362093	Switzerland	0.0416102	
Indonesia	0.0776737	United States of America	-0.0073755	
Malawi	0.0007937			

Global population 10-24 years old

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Synthetic control group

- Due to non-linearities (especially in the pre-ratification period) we subtract the treated and control groups, obtaining a single group.
- The group represents the difference in smokers between the treated and the control groups for each year before and after ratification.

Global population 10-24 years old

TABACONOMÍA EVIDENCIA ECONÓMICA PARA EL CONTROL DEL TABACO Interrupted Time Series Analysis

• $Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_t + \beta_2 X_t + \beta_3 X_t T_t + \beta_4 X_t T_t^2$

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 β_3

 β_4

Dependent variable

 Y_t

 T_t

 X_t

 $X_t T_t$

Years since Ratification

Treatment Dummy

Interaction Term

 $\mathcal{B}_{\mathbf{0}}$ Initial intercept

Pre-intervention Trend

Change in Level immediately after intervention

Change in Trend after intervention

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World vs Countries that did not Ratify Difference in smokers between treated and control group Compared with counterfactual using Synthetic Control Result of subtracting the series of both groups 160 \diamond 25 Number of million of smokers \diamond Difference in millions of smokers 20 0 \diamond \diamond * * * * * \diamond 150 \diamond \diamond 15 \diamond \diamond ۲ \diamond ð \diamond \diamond 10 140 \diamond \diamond \diamond \diamond 5 \diamond \diamond \diamond \diamond <mark>0</mark> _ \$ 130 \diamond $\diamond \diamond \diamond$ \diamond \diamond -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 -15 -10 -5 5 10 0 Years since Ratification Years since Ratification Countries that Ratified Synthetic Control

Global population 10-24 years old

Men vs Countries that did not Ratify Compared with counterfactual using Synthetic Control Difference in smokers between treated and control group Result of subtracting the series of both groups 115 \diamond 15 Number of million of smokers Difference in millions of smokers \diamond \diamond \diamond 110 \diamond \diamond ۵ 10 ا \diamond ⊗ \diamond ⊘ ⊘ \diamond \diamond 105 ⊗ \diamond ۲ \diamond \diamond 5 \diamond \diamond \diamond ◊ ◊ \land 100 $^{\circ}$ \diamond \diamond \diamond 0 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 Years since Ratification Years since Ratification Countries that Ratified * Synthetic Control

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Male population 10-24 years old

Female population 10-24 years old

Results for the population 10-24 years old

		A 11	Sex		Income	
		All	Male	Female	High	LMIC
	eta_0 : Gap in level	221.77*	50.66	25.86*	-120.57**	2.96
	eta_1 : Gap in pre-intervention trend	-36.49	-8.99	-4.02	17.26 ***	-0.35
	eta_2 : Gap in immediate change	1064.65**	1102.23***	32.85	565.52 ***	-579.27
	eta_3 : Gap in change in trend post-ratification	1447.26***	300.22***	527.89***	113.60***	264.78
	eta_4 : Gap in change in trend post-ratification ^2	109.71***	117.49***	30.74***	48.98**	198.9341***
	Effect after 10 years	26,508.1***	15,854.3***	8,385.3***	6,599.8***	21,961.9***
	Average change in trend	2,654.1***	1,592.7***	865.9***	652.4***	2,453.1***

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Results for the population 10-24 years old

- About 26,5 million fewer smokers after ten years of ratification
- About 15.8 million male and 8,4 million female fewer smokers
- This is equivalent to a reduction of 20%, 16% and 24.8% in current smokers after ten years since ratification, respectively
- About 6.6 million fewer smokers in high-income countries and 22 million fewer smokers in low and middle-income countries
- This is equivalent to a reduction of 26,1% and 20,5% in current smokers after ten years since ratification, respectively

Results for the population 25 years and older

		A 11	Sex		Income	
		All	Male	Female	High	LMIC
eta_0 : Gap in le	vel	85.76	85.18	290.68***	-1.33	13.15
eta_1 : Gap in pre-inte	rvention	-12.51	-12.38	-41.35***	0.42	-1.89
eta_2 : Gap in immedia	te change	1634.94	-2072.66**	-337.06**	1006.59***	-1304.95
eta_3 : Gap in change post-ratificat	in trend	523.19	905.76***	-136.00**	242.77***	926.71***
eta_4 : Gap in change post-ratification	in trend n ^2	90.99**	/	87.68***	113.216***	/
Effect after 10	years 226	596.5***	6985***	7071.3***	14756***	7962.2***
Average change	in trend 2,6	524.1***	1,592.7***	828.5***	4,488.2***	926.7***

Results for the population 25 years and older

- About 22.7 million fewer smokers ten years after ratification
- About 7 million male and 7 million female fewer smokers
- This is equivalent to a reduction of 4.2%, 1.7% and 6.1% in current smokers after ten years since ratification, respectively
- About 14.8 million fewer smokers in high-income countries and 8 million fewer smokers in low and middle-income countries smokers
- This is equivalent to a reduction of 10.9% and 2% in current smokers after ten years since ratification, respectively

Questions

- What is the effect of using modelled data?
- Is it reasonable to subtract treated and control groups?

Preliminary conclusions

- If the countries had not ratified, the global current smoker prevalence would have been about 2 percentage points higher ten years after ratification.
- In terms of sex, that would have been 2.3 and 1.3 percentage points higher for men and women, respectively
- In terms of income groups, that would have been 4.8 and 1.8 for high-income countries and low- and middle-income countries, respectively
- FCTC was successful in controlling the evolution of tobacco users

Thank you !!!

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